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ABSTRACT
ANNE E. CROOK.  Uncertainty and Reasonable
Assurance: Why We Need to Teach Regulators to
Focus on Uncertainty in Risk Assessment and
Risk Management.  (Under the direction of Dr.
DOUGLAS J. CRAWFORD-BROWN)
The rationality of regulatory decisions is inextricably
linked to an explicit representation of the uncertainty
underlying scientific predictions.  The level of
coverage of uncertainty in training programs on risk
assessment and risk management developed by the EPA is
examined in light of the above thesis.  Using the EPA's
Office Of Drinking Water's Workshops on Assessment and
Management of Drinking Water Contamination (EPA, 1988)
as an example, concepts for formalizing consideration
of uncertainty are presented.  A case study on the
risks from radon in drinking water is developed to
illustrate the recommended level of coverage of
uncertainty in EPA training programs.
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CHAPTER 1
WHY UNCERTAINTY IS IMPORTANT:  AN EXAMPLE__________________
Regulators cannot be expected to make rational
decisions based on risk assessment without understanding the
uncertainty involved.  One way to think about making a
decision is to ask whether the evidence is sufficient to
justify a particular action (Crawford-Brown and Pearce,
1989).  A regulator is never confronted by certainties, but
by an array of evidence, some of which may be contradictory
and all of which will be inconclusive.  For any given set of
evidence, he must ask himself whether it is sufficient to
justify action (which includes inaction), and if it is, how
strong an action, or what type of action.  Uncertainty is a
fundamental part of that evidence.  The decision maker must
ask himself not "is this the best decision in terms of
expected value?" but "is this level of certainty sufficient
to justify action X?"
The EPA has recognized how important it is for the
users of risk assessment to have a general understanding of
risk assessment and risk management, and has developed a
variety of training materials to meet this need.  The
6primary goal of most of these materials is to give the user
an appreciation for the basis and complexities of each of
these disciplines as they are performed by EPA.  Users of
these materials should come away from them better equipped
to use and understand the results of EPA risk assessment and
risk management.  The materials are largely aimed at
decision-making professionals in public health or
environmental regulation.
Any training program for users of risk assessment that
is designed to promote an understanding of the basic
premises and complexities of risk assessment and risk
management would be incomplete if it did not encourage
participants to consider the implications of uncertainty and
the degree of certainty they require to justify specific
kinds of decisions or take specific actions.  A selection of
these training materials, evaluated for EPA's ODW (Crook,
1988), reveals a failure to address uncertainty in even a
rudimentary way.  Explicit coverage of uncertainty is, in
fact, almost totally missing from these training materials.
This report describes why explicit coverage of
uncertainty is necessary in EPA risk training materials, and
makes a suggestion as to the kinds of information about
uncertainty that are necessary to help regulators achieve
reasonable assurance that regulations will result in an
7acceptable outcome.  Using the EPA's Office of Drinking
Water's Workshops on Assessment and Management of Drinking
Water Contamination (EPA, 1988) as an example, this report
will make recommendations on how uncertainty might be
treated in such training materials by providing a fully
developed case study that might be included in such a
workshop.
The rest of this chapter will describe the EPA's Office
of Drinking Water's Workshops on Assessment and Management
of Drinking Water Contamination (the Workshop) as an example
of the absence of uncertainty from training materials and
the need for it in them.  Chapter 2 develops the need for
uncertainty in more theoretical terms.  Chapter 3 develops
some useful concepts about uncertainty and incorporating
them into existing materials.  Chapter 4 provides a fully
developed case study, using radon in drinking water, that
could be used in training materials.
Workshops on Assessment and
Management of Drinking Water Contamination
Several times a year, EPA's Office of Drinking Water
conducts a three-day training course for professionals
8concerned with protecting drinking water.-^  It is designed
to give them an overview of risk assessment, risk
management, and risk communication as they are conducted by
EPA. It is not intended to make the participants experts in
any of these areas, but rather to provide an appreciation of
how these tasks are performed by EPA and to identify the
major issues and complexities.
The Workshop consists of a series of presentations on a
selection of subject areas, which are presented in
Table 1-1.  The presentations for risk assessment and risk
management each are followed by a hands-on case study.
Individuals work through the case studies during the
evening, and then discuss them in small groups of about ten
people, assisted by a facilitator, the following day.  The
Workshop spends about one day each on risk assessment, risk
management, and risk communication.  The section on risk
communication focuses on communication of risk to the public
by public officials, and is beyond the scope of this report.
The discussion of the Workshop largely refers toits general form.  Specific remarks about the
questions and difficulties of participants refer
to the Workshop conducted in August 1988 in ValleyForge, PA.
Overview of ODW Workshop Content
The Workshop section on risk assessment is divided into
three parts: principles of toxicology, toxicological
approaches used in developing national drinking water
standards, and the risk assessment case study.
The Workshop section on principles of toxicology
generally provides excellent coverage of a complex topic.
However, the only mention of uncertainty or variability in
the entire presentation is the use of a graph of a
cumulative probability function showing the LDSO^ of several
compounds (see Figure 1-1), representing the variability of
thresholds for a log-probit effects model.  The Y-axis of
the graph is in probit units, which are a unit of measure of
standard deviation (one probit unit is the equivalent of one
standard deviation).  The graph is not explained.  At the
August 1988 Workshop, this provoked some confusion; one
participant asked what the probit units on the Y-axis meant,
and received a fairly unsatisfactory answer, the gist of
which was "it's statistics; don't worry about it."
The section on toxicological approaches used in
developing national drinking water standards is an excellent
The LD50, or lethal dose 50, is the dose required
to kill half the animals in a dose-response experiment
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overview of how risk assessment is used to develop drinking
water standards.  The speaker does not touch upon
uncertainty, except tangentially in drawing a distinction
between science and policy in risk assessment.  He points
out that EPA's use of the linearized multistage dose-
response model for cancer is a policy choice, based on a
policy decision to be conservative, rather than a
"scientific" choice based on some scientific proof or
certainty that the model is correct.  This is essentially
the only mention of uncertainty in this section.  This would
be a good place for the Workshop to speak of reasonable
assurance, since the linearized multistage model is claimed
to provide strong assurance.
The risk assessment case study concerns whether vinyl
chloride should be classified as a carcinogen, and explores
reasons for such a decision.  Participants work through the
case study individually then split into groups of about ten
to discuss the problem and reach a group conclusion.  The
information is presented clearly, and provides some
necessary guidance, such as "issues to consider" to help
steer, but not eliminate, the thinking process.  The "issues
to consider" does include some questions on how confident
the participant is about the evidence presented.  The case
study also provides a list of alternative conclusions at the
end of each section of the case study, including a
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"formulate your own conclusion" option.  At the August 1988
Workshop, the participants were quite willing to formulate
their own hybrid conclusions from the alternatives presented
and their own ideas, but they were relatively unequipped and
unwilling to deal with the questions of uncertainty.  They
tended to make an unarticulated choice to be conservative
rather than to discuss the uncertainties.  This is not
surprising, since the Workshop lectures do not give them a
framework for thinking about and discussing uncertainty.
This leaves them feeling uncertain, but without a way to
articulate it.
After the case study groups reconvene, the coordinators
distribute a handout that provides additional information on
the case study problem and poses questions about how (and
whether) this new information would change the decision
reached by the group and the reasons for that decision.
Incorporating new information and understanding how (or
whether) more information would affect decisions is an
important part of the risk assessment process;
unfortunately, the coordinators do not take the opportunity
to discuss this idea or the idea that reducing ignorance (by
obtaining new information) can mean reducing uncertainty and
increasing confidence.  Particularly lacking is a discussion
of the links between this increased confidence and the
justification of regulatory decisions or actions.
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The risk management section reveals a disappointing
tendency to equate risk management with treatment
technology.  While treatment is undeniably an important
aspect of risk management, it is not the only one. The
handout for the introduction to the section on risk
management states that risk management "integrates health,
technology, economic, political and other considerations,"
(and surely dealing with uncertainty should be included in
"other considerations") but this idea is not reflected in
the remainder of the risk management section. The section
would be strengthened by the addition of material on
uncertainty (as well as economic and political
considerations).
The risk management case study suffers from the
omission of uncertainty in the risk management
presentations.  At the August 1988 Workshop, the case study
participants seemed unwilling to consider the uncertainties
in the problem situation when choosing an alternative.  For
example, the problem is based on only two samples from some
contaminated wells, but participants were generally
resistant to the possibility that sampling results are
uncertain and that this should affect the decision.  These
examples illustrate how great the need is to discuss these
issues explicitly.
13
This report will establish that it is necessary to
teach risk assessment and risk management so the workshop
participant grasps that focusing on uncertainty is a major
component in demonstrating reasonable assurance that a
regulation will accomplish the desired goals.
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TABLE 1-1
TOPICS COVERED IN ODW WORKSHOP
o   Regional/state update
o   Risk Assessment:
Principles of Toxicology
; -   Principles of Absorbtion, Distribution,
Metabolism and Excretion of Chemicals
Toxicological Approaches Used in
Developing National Drinking Water
Standards
ODW Health Advisory Program
Toxicology of Inorganics, Pesticides,
Solvents and Vapors
Principles of Carcinogenicity
Principles of Risk Assessment
Risk Assessment Case Study
o   Risk Management:
Overview of Treatment Technology as it
Applies to Risk Management
Inorganics and Radionuclide Treatment
Organics Treatment, Case Histories
(granular activated carbon and aeration)
Risk Management Case Study
o   Risk Communication:
Video
Speaker
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FIGURE 1-1
LD50 FIGURE FROM ODW WORKSHOP
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CHAPTER 2
WHY UNCERTAINTY IS IMPORTANT:
SOME DEFINITIONS AND A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
DEFINITIONS
The analysis of risk is a field in which no two authors
seem to define their terms the same way.  To avoid
confusion, six words or phrases that are central to the
argument made in this report are defined below.  They are:
risk, risk assessment, risk management, uncertainty,
reasonable assurance, and confidence.
Risk
Risk is used in this report to mean the probability of
an outcome of interest for an individual or the frequency of
effect in a population.  It also includes a consideration of
the severity of the effect.  For example, the probability of
getting lung cancer from radon in drinking water is a
measure of the risk.  A quality of the risk estimate (as
opposed to the risk itself) is the confidence placed on the
reliability of that estimate.
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Risk Assessment and Risk Management
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in the
Office of Drinking Water's Workshops on Assessment and
Management of Drinking Water Contamination (EPA 1988),
defines "risk assessment" as follows:
the scientific estimation of hazard which is
obtained by combining the results of an exposure
assessment with the results of the toxicity
assessment for the subject chemical.
In the same source, EPA (1988) defines "risk management" as
follows:
the judgement and analysis that combine the
scientific results of a risk assessment with
economic, political, legal, and social factors to
produce a decision about environmental action.
I will adopt these definitions of "risk assessment" and
"risk management" with one caveat.  The word "scientific"
(which appears in the definition of risk assessment) is
often taken (incorrectly) as connoting certainty or at least
extreme epistemic strength; such a connotation should be
avoided.  Instead, the word "scientific" in the definition
of risk assessment should be taken as connoting a systematic
endeavor by a well-defined social group designed to confront
and resolve uncertainties.  Since uncertainty is a
18
fundamental part of the process of science, the uncertainty
of science should be incorporated in risk assessment
systematically.  An awareness of the need to incorporate
uncertainty in risk assessment is crucial to the
professionals who use risk assessment and to those who are
affected by risk management decisions.
Uncertainty
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines
"uncertainty" as "the quality or state of being uncertain,"
and "uncertain" as follows:
1: INDEFINITE, INDETERMINATE  2: not certain to
occur: PROBLEMATICAL  3: not reliable:
UNTRUSTWORTHY 4 a: not known beyond doubt:
DUBIOUS b: not having certain knowledge: DOUBTFUL
c: not clearly identified or defined 5: not
constant: VARIABLE, FITFUL.
These definitions are all applicable to risk assessment and
risk management.  Anything that is projected to occur in the
future is indeterminate (for example, at what time will low
level radioactive waste begin to escape from a land disposal
unit).  Many events predicted in risk assessment are not
certain to occur (for example, if a person is exposed to a
small amount of radon, cancer is not certain to occur).
Data frequently are not reliable (for example, a laboratory
animal study may have been done poorly).  Many factors in
19
risk assessment are not known beyond a doubt or we do not
have certain knowledge of them (for example, the mechanism
by which carcinogens cause cancer is not known with
certainty).  Factors in risk assessment may not be clearly
defined (for example, "cancers" in a lab study may mean only
malignant tumors or both benign and malignant tumors).
Finally, many aspects of risk assessment are not constant,
either over time (such as exposure) or within populations
(such as threshold or sensitivity).  The net result of these
considerations is that all of risk assessment, from
specification of analytical categories to required physical
parameters, is characterized by uncertainty.
Reasonable Assurance
According to Webster's, assurance can mean "confidence
of mind... : easy freedom from... uncertainty."  (def. 2c)
Reasonable will be used here in the sense of giving reasons:
something is reasonable if reasons may be given for it.
Thus reasonable assurance may be defined as giving reasons
that provide confidence that predictions about risk are
correct.  For EPA, the kind of reasons that give confidence
are scientific models and data (Crawford-Brown and Cothern,
1987).
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Reasonable can also mean "not extreme or excessive"
(Webster's, def. lb).  In this context, the phrase
reasonable assurance also implies that it is possible to
require excessive, or unreasonable, confidence.
Reasonable assurance implies that regulators are making
a trade-off between increased cost and increased confidence,
not increased cost and decreased risk.  A wide variety of
different risk levels may possibly result from a particular
regulation, some of which would be acceptable and some of
which would not.-^ The more stringent the regulation, the
more likely it is that the actual resulting risk will prove
to be acceptable.  Therefore, regulatory stringency is not
simply buying a reduction in risk, but also an increase in
confidence that the actual (unknown) risk will be
acceptable.
Confidence
It has been asserted that EPA requires the use of
scientific models to have confidence.  But scientific models
can lead to different levels of confidence.  The idea of
Setting the acceptable risk level is a complex
policy issue and is beyond the scope of this
report.  In general, the acceptable level is
either a policy given, as in an inference
guideline, or a publicly determined result.  In
neither case is it left to the analyst's choice.
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science as a craft is one way of formalizing that fact.
Ravetz (1971) proposes that one important measure of
crafting is precision: how good the fit is between reality
and the predictions of science.  A science that is well-
crafted will make predictions that fit well with reality,
while one that is poorly-crafted will make predictions that
do not fit well with reality.  Ravetz also asserts that
scientists learn the methods of performing science and
avoiding pitfalls from other scientists, and that this craft
knowledge, combined with a scientist's personal style, is
fundamental to the achievement of scientific knowledge.  He
goes on to argue that when a scientific discipline is
mature, craft knowledge allows its practitioners to chart
their way around most of the pitfalls fairly easily.  When a
scientific discipline is young, however, the craft knowledge
of pitfalls does not yet exist and must be learned by
experience.  Therefore, science may be well-crafted or
poorly-crafted, depending on how well its predictions fit
with reality and how well developed the craft knowledge of
the discipline is.
It is reasonable to suppose that the more well-crafted
an aspect of science is, the more confidence we will have in
its results.  A well-crafted discipline will have both
pragmatic (or historical) evidence to support it, as well as
a sound theoretical basis.  Put more simply, if some aspect
22
of science is well-crafted, it works repeatedly (pragmatic
evidence) and we understand why (theoretical evidence).
Such a well-crafted discipline makes a more convincing case
than a discipline that is less well-crafted.  A less well-
crafted discipline might be one with a theoretical basis but
no pragmatic evidence, or one with some pragmatic evidence,
but no theoretical basis.  While it might appear on the
surface that a pragmatic support would be equally compelling
with or without theoretical understanding, this is not so.
Pragmatic evidence is most powerful in the setting in which
it was obtained.  With no theoretical basis to identify the
important variables in the setting, a scientist must be less
certain when applying pragmatic evidence in a setting even
slightly different from the one from which the evidence was
derived.  When, however, a scientist has theoretical
evidence in addition to pragmatic evidence, it is possible
to determine whether the new setting differs from the old
setting in any respect that could significantly influence
the precision of results.  Therefore, a discipline in which
the pragmatic evidence is backed up by theoretical
understanding is more well-crafted than one in which the
pragmatic evidence stands alone.  Obviously, pragmatic or
theoretical evidence alone results in a more well-crafted
discipline than no evidence.
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WHY UNCERTAINTY IS IMPORTANT
Two approaches to uncertainty in risk assessment and
risk management are widely used, but neither of them deals
explicitly or adequately with uncertainty.
The first is the use of the "best estimate" at each
step of the risk assessment.  Uncertainty is admitted and
then resolved by comparing the relative merits of various
predictions of risk.  "Best" may mean different things to
different people, and may be represented by a mean, median,
or mode.  Although this method may give the "best" single
estimate of risk (e.g., the probability of getting cancer)
in some sense, no single estimate is likely to be the true
value when the distribution of estimates is wide.
Therefore, with a "best" estimate of the risk, the regulator
cannot be reasonably confident that the risk that actually
results from the regulation will be as calculated and,
therefore, acceptable; the true risk is very unlikely to
equal the best estimate, and there is usually a fairly large
probability that the risk will in fact be larger than the
best estimate.  If the regulation has been chosen so that
the best estimate of risk coincides with the acceptable
level of risk (or even a factor of ten or more lower than
the acceptable risk), this approach may lead to a non-
negligible probability that the regulation will fail to
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bring about the desired state of the world (an acceptable
level of risk).
The second approach commonly used in risk assessment is
the conservative approach.  Conservative values (i.e., those
tending to bias the results in the direction of the upper
bound of the outcome) are used for each factor in the risk
assessment, typically the value that represents the 95th
percentile of the data.  This leads to a final risk level
that is even more conservative, in most cases, than any of
the inputs.  As a result, a stricter regulation must be
promulgated to reach an acceptable risk than if less
conservative inputs were used.  Stricter regulations usually
result in greater compliance costs than lenient regulations.
The conservative approach may result in unreasonable, or
excessive, confidence.
A single estimate of the risk (e.g., the probability of
getting cancer, generated by either of the above methods)
may be useful in making a trade-off between cost and risk.
To make a trade-off between cost and confidence the
regulator must have as complete a confidence distribution of
the risk for each regulatory alternative as is possible.
This allows him to see his confidence that each regulatory
option will result in an acceptable risk.  By combining this
with the cost of achieving different levels of confidence
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(through different regulatory options), the regulator can
make the trade-off between cost and confidence explicit,
allowing him to have reasonable assurance that the actual
risk will be acceptable without excessive demands for
confidence.
The Interpretation of Reasonable Assurance
An important concern of regulators when they are
pursuing reasonable assurance will be how the courts will
interpret "reasonable assurance."  There is not a specific
precedent for the interpretation of the word "reasonable" in
this exact context.  However, courts have two tendencies
that may be relevant to this issue.'''  The first, more
general, tendency is that on some fuzzy issues of
interpretation, a court may rely on the premise that "we
know it when we see it."  Applied to the phrase "reasonable
assurance," this means the court can't define "reasonable
assurance" generally, but feels it can look at any
particular case and say whether or not it constitutes
reasonable assurance.  Therefore, the court may bring its
own sense of reasonableness to the interpretation, or it may
try to rely on some other concept of reasonableness (such as
the "reasonable man" of common law negligence doctrine).
I am indebted to Mike Berry and Milton Heath for
their insightful comments on this subject, from
which this discussion took its shape.
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The second, more specific, tendency that courts follow
in cases involving regulatory agencies is the use of the
doctrine of the hard look. Under this doctrine, a court
examines the rigor of the analysis performed by the agency
in setting a regulation, rather than passing judgement on
the quality or correctness of the resulting regulation. A
court is looking at process instead of content in the
doctrine of the hard look.  Thus, a court using this
doctrine will tend to support the agency when the agency has
done a rigorous analysis, regardless of the outcome of that
analysis.  One reason for this approach is that courts are
not experts in the fields in which agencies set regulations
and are not, therefore, well-qualified to judge the content
of a technical regulation (a factor presumably required for
the recognition of reasonable confidence in the first
approach discussed above).  They are, however, quite
competent to judge the quality and rigor of the process that
produced the regulation, and this is what the court is doing
in the doctrine of the hard look.
Under both these approaches, a court is likely to look
more favorably on a regulation that is based on a full
consideration of uncertainty.  Under the first approach, an
explicit representation of uncertainty puts the court more
fully in the regulator's position and thus increases the
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likelihood that the court will understand the base of
confidence faced by the regulator.  Under the doctrine of
the hard look, an explicit treatment of uncertainty
increases the rigor of the analysis and, therefore, the
likelihood that the court will look favorably on it.
CHAPTER 3   .
SOME USEFUL CONCEPTS ABOUT UNCERTAINTY
REASONS FOR BEING UNCERTAIN '
Uncertainty can arise from many different sources and
be of many different types, but these all have their roots
in a limited number of fundamental reasons for being
uncertain.  For example, a regulator may be uncertain about
the correct dose-response model for carcinogens.  This is a
specific type of uncertainty that is part of a more general
type of uncertainty: uncertainty about models and their
relationship to the phenomena they model.  The reason for
this uncertainty is ignorance:  science has not discovered
completely how substances produce cancer.  The type or
source of uncertainty may be either general or specific, but
the reasons for uncertainty are all very general.
Uncertainty may arise from any of at least three
fundamental reasons for being uncertain, as follows:
o   Conceptual/Perceptual Factors
o   Ignorance
o   Variability
29
Each of these reasons has different implications for risk
assessment and risk management.
Conceptual/Perceptual Factors
Conceptual uncertainty exists because a regulator may
not have asked an important question during the risk
assessment process, or may have asked it in a vague manner.
The situation he is studying may be affected by some factor
that he has not considered. A common example of this is
confounding in epidemiological studies.  Confounding occurs
in the study of the association between an exposure and a
disease when a third variable is associated with the
exposure and also affects the incidence of the disease
independent of the exposure of interest.  The presence of
the confounding variable can make an association appear
where none exists or mask an existing association.  Failure
to consider such a factor might (or might not) render the
results meaningless or incorrect.  What a regulator thinks
he is seeing and what he is really seeing may be two
different things if the problem as framed is not
conceptually complete. So a regulator needs to consider
whether he has asked all the relevant questions.  But he can
never be sure that he has, so he must be uncertain about the
30
results and their relationship to the overall goals of
regulation.
Two major problems arise under conceptual and
perceptual uncertainty.  The first is the assignment of
analytical categories of effects.  The regulator must decide
what "counts" as an effect in the risk assessment.  Will he
consider only cancer mortality? Cancer morbidity?
Noncancer effects?  The choice of these analytic categories
gives rise to conceptual uncertainty.  The second area that
results in conceptual uncertainty is the issue of what is
meant by confidence.  The regulator must decide how he will
measure confidence, and this choice also gives rise to
uncertainty.
Uncertainty arising from conceptual and perceptual
causes is not directly quantifiable.  The regulator may be
aware of the possibility that he has either asked the wrong
question or has failed to ask a relevant question, but he
cannot fully know the extent of this difficulty.  He may
reduce conceptual uncertainty by using procedures to elicit
alternative ways to formulate the problem, but such
techniques can never eliminate the uncertainty, as the
regulator can never be certain that there are not additional
questions he has missed.
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Ignorance
Many of the uncertainties mentioned in the literature
may be attributed to ignorance and insufficient information.
When uncertainty is caused by ignorance, a correct answer
exists, but it has not yet been found (this being different
from conceptual uncertainty where humans must decide on the
most important questions to be addressed).  Four common
types of uncertainty in risk assessment have their roots in
ignorance.  These are uncertainty about the following:
o Theories
o Model form
o Data choice
o Parameter estimates
The process of risk assessment is built on a framework of
theories, models, data, and parameter estimation.  For any
particular risk situation there may be multiple theories
describing the analytical categories and the physical laws
relating them.  For each theory there may be several
different possible models formalizing the theory into
mathematical equations.  Finally, the regulator will be
faced with competing sets of data from which parameter
values (appearing in the mathematical equation) may be
obtained.  Since different statistical procedures may be
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applied to obtain these parameter values from any specific
set of data, parameter estimation is also characterized by
uncertainty.  The regulator is usually ignorant as to which
combination of theory, model, data, and parameter estimation
technigue (if any) is the right one.
Theoretical uncertainty often arises from the following
guestions:
o   Which of the available theories is correct?
o   Have we thought of the correct theory at all?
o   Does a theory hold outside the boundaries
within which it has been tested?
o   Does the theory specify all analytical
categories playing a causal role in the
phenomenon?
Whenever there is more than one theory, there will be some
uncertainty about which is correct.  For example, a variety
of theories exist on the mechanisms by which chemicals cause
cancer, and neither scientists nor regulators know which, if
any, of them is correct.  In fact, scientists may not have
thought of the correct theory at all, so that none of the
existing theories is correct.  Finally, even if a theory is
well-accepted in one realm, it may not apply in others.  For
example, different chemicals might cause cancer in different
ways, so that one theory of carcinogenesis might hold for
some chemicals but not for others.  The ability of the
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theory to explain the behavior of one chemical may,
therefore, fail to provide confidence that it applies to
another chemical.  Similarly, a theory may hold for some
species (such as rats) and not for others (such as humans).
Once a theory (such as a multistage theory) is
specified, it must be formalized into a mathematical model
for purposes of prediction.  Uncertainty about models in
risk assessment may arise from these questions:
o   Which model is correct?
o   Does the model reflect the theory accurately?
o   Does the model contain the correct parameters
as entailed by the theory?
o   Can the model be extrapolated outside the
experimental range?
o    Is the model complete (i.e., does it include
a representation of all analytical categories
required by the theory, or at least all those
adequate for reasonable precision)?
Models may not contain all of the terms specified by a
theory.  Some terms may be left out because they can't be
measured.  Some may be left out because they can't be
related yet to measurements.  Some may be left out because
the regulator does not have time to make measurements.
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Conceptual Uncertainty Arising from Ignorance
In risk assessment, the regulator is seldom able to use
data that measure directly what he is interested in.
Instead, he uses the data available and extrapolates it to
the situation of interest.  This gives rise to conceptual
uncertainties about the following issues:
o   How should conflicting results be reconciled?
o   Is extrapolation valid?
o   How should different kinds of evidence be
weighted?
Conflicting results are often dealt with by using the one
that results in the most conservative action.  For instance,
if some studies show a substance causes cancer and others do
not, a regulator may treat the substance as a carcinogen to
be on the safe side.  This conflict in the data produces
uncertainty.  EPA has a weight of evidence classification
scheme for carcinogens that is intended to reflect a
judgement about all available data.  The classifications are
listed in Table 3-1.
Variability
A third basic reason for uncertainty is variability.
Variability is different from the other reasons for
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uncertainty in that it is a phenomenon to be described and
accounted for, rather than eliminated.  Many parameters and
processes of interest in risk assessment are inherently
variable: there is no single correct answer, but a
distribution of actual (existing) answers.  An example is
sensitivity in a population: some subgroups may be more
sensitive to the toxic effects of a chemical than other
subgroups.  Another example is wind and weather patterns
(which are used in transport models).  Variability may also
be a cause of uncertainty in the measurement of a fixed
parameter because the measurement process is variable.
Variability is one cause of uncertainty that can be
readily quantified by probability and statistics.  A
regulator may artificially "reduce" variability by dealing
with homogeneous subsets of the varying population, but he
can't really reduce or eliminate it, nor is that really
desirable.  Variability is not a problem to be eliminated,
but a state of the world that the regulator must describe
and consider in risk assessment.
APPROACHES TO DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY
A regulator may try to reduce uncertainty or he may
describe uncertainty qualitatively or quantitatively.  The
3 6
appropriateness of each of these approaches depends on the
cause of the uncertainty.
Reducing Uncertainty
The regulator can reduce uncertainty due to ignorance
by doing more research or getting more information.  The
regulator may also reduce conceptual uncertainty by asking
more questions and looking for new information.  These
reasons for uncertainty will never be eliminated entirely,
but they can be both reduced and understood.  The remaining
cause of uncertainty, variability, is not amenable to
reduction or elimination.  If a thing is inherently
variable, research may reduce the regulator's ignorance
about its distribution, but it will never remove its
variability.
Additional research can be quite valuable, but it is
often expensive and time consuming.  Depending on the
problem, it may or may not be worth the investment of time
and money to obtain better information.  One approach to
deciding whether to pursue better information and for what
parameters is sensitivity analysis.  Sensitivity analysis
considers the effect of individual components of uncertainty
on the overall uncertainty.  The greater effect an
individual component has on the overall uncertainty, the
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more worthwhile (or reasonable) the reduction of that
component of uncertainty will be.  An example of this will
be given in the case study in Chapter 4.
Describing Uncertainty
Uncertainty can be described both qualitatively and
quantitatively. This does not reduce or eliminate
uncertainty, but may be quite helpful to the decision maker.
Uncertainty due to ignorance might be described
qualitatively by saying something like "our ignorance in
this area is problematical but not crippling to the
analysis" or "our ignorance in this area makes useful
analysis impossible."  Similarly, a regulator might know
that the uncertainties are relatively large or relatively
small. Unfortunately, these phrases may mean different
things to different people; they are imprecise.  Whether or
not this limits their usefulness is a matter of debate.  As
a result, such qualitative approaches might still be
explored in any discussion of uncertainty.
A quantitative description of uncertainty may be more
useful because it can be presented more precisely, although
not necessarily more clearly.  There is also the risk of
excessive precision; see Ravetz (1971).  Probability is an
important tool for describing some types of uncertainty
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quantitatively.  Probability may be divided into two types:
long-term frequency and subjective or Bayesian.  Long term
frequency is the idea of probability as the limit of the
frequency of an event over a large number of trials, and is
primarily useful in areas where there is some past
experience (or trials) available and where such trials can
easily be performed.  A wide variety of statistical methods
are based on this kind of probability and can be used to
describe uncertainty due to variability or imprecise
sampling data.
Subjective probability is a measure of someone's
belief; for example, a scientist's belief about whether a
theory is true.  Subjective probability is useful where
there is little or no prior experience and trials either
cannot or have not been performed (or where trails are in
fact meaningless).  Long-term frequency approaches are
particularly weak in dealing with confidence assigned to
theories.  Using Bayes Rule, subjective beliefs about
theories or models, called prior probabilities, may be
combined with experimental observations and the probability
that such observations would result from each theory or
model to obtain a probability, called a posterior
probability, which takes both the subjective and objective
elements of evidence into account.  Bayesian probabilities
can be used to describe any kind of uncertainty that a
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regulator has a belief about, but are most useful when no
long-terra frequency data are available or obtainable, such
as when uncertainties are due to incomplete information
(ignorance).  The difficulty with Bayesian probabilities is
that they represent an individual's beliefs about
probabilities, which may or may not be well founded.
Bayesian probabilities are a way of quantifying uncertainty
that is thought of as unquantifiable within a long-term
frequency approach.  Whether a regulator should be willing
to use such a quantification is a debatable issue; however,
EPA has used such quantifications (see the case study in
Chapter 4).
Regardless of the type of probability, long term
frequency or Bayesian, quantified probabilities should be
presented in a way that is useful to the decision maker.
Two particularly useful forms, which work best when shown
together, are the probability density function and the
cumulative probability distribution, shown in Figure 3-1.
(Another example of these is shown in Figure 1-1, from the
Workshop.)  The probability density function shows the
probability of a particular outcome, while the cumulative
probability distribution shows the probability that the
outcome will fall below any particular value.
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Decision making is not a trivial process even in the
absence of uncertainty.  Most social problems have multiple
conflicting goals; making trade-offs among them can be so
difficult that  an enormous literature has grown up on this
subject.  Problems arise because risk assessment and risk
management cannot be neatly separated into questions of fact
and questions of values; rather, the two are intermingled at
every step.  Gumming (1981) calls risk assessment a "trans-
science:" a discipline in which questions can be asked
within a scientific framework, but are "beyond the capacity
of science to answer."  An example of the intertwining of
fact and value in risk assessment is risk acceptability.
Even as risk assessors struggle to determine what the risk
in a given situation is, the person who will make use of the
risk assessment must also struggle to decide how much risk
is acceptable.  Science cannot answer this question, nor is
it clear that there is a single right answer.
Out of a desire to put as many of the questions arising
in risk assessment within the "capacity of science to
answer" and so simplify an already difficult decision,
regulatory decision makers often ignore uncertainty and are,
as a result, extremely overconfident in the results of risk
assessment. Numerous studies (aptly summarized in Morgan,
Henrion, and Small, 1990) have shown the overconfidence of
both lay people and experts (even in their field of
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expertise) when asked to make predictions.  Clearly then,
the consideration of uncertainty needs to be made explicit
in an effort to counteract a natural tendency toward
overconfidence, and because reasonable confidence implies a
reasonable procedure for assigning confidence.
How should uncertainty be included in decision making?
How should decision makers think about making decisions when
they are uncertain?  Decision theory can help to illuminate
choices made under uncertainty when the uncertainty can be
quantified.  Uncertainty may be propagated through a
decision tree to produce a range of possible outcomes and
the probability (or confidence) of each.  The value of each
outcome is multiplied by the probability of its occurrence
and the result is then summed over all outcomes for a
particular decision to arrive at an expected value for that
decision.  Sensitivity analysis can identify the parameters
that most affect the decision.  Expected values, while
useful, can also hide important information if improperly
used.  A certain outcome of five cancers and an outcome
where there is a probability of 0.5 of ten cancers and a
probability of 0.5 of zero cancers both have an expected
value of five, but are obviously not equivalent: the second
situation is less certain than the first.  The use of
expected values hides the uncertainty.  It shields the
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regulator from an explicit decision as to how uncertainty
should be resolved.
Evidence that contains a lot of uncertainty does not
necessarily mean that the decision maker should not act.  In
fact, sometimes the regulator is compelled to act regardless
of the evidence because of statutory or political reasons.
Also, a great deal of uncertainty may motivate the regulator
to choose a very conservative regulation and to try to get
more information, while a less uncertain situation might
allow the regulator to set a less conservative standard
(because he is more certain it will result in an acceptable
outcome).  The level of uncertainty may, however, affect how
the regulator approaches the regulation; for example, he
might regulate by way of best available technology, a
standard (say for drinking water), a reguired treatment
technology, or a labelling or disclosure requirement.
FORMALIZING CONCEPTS ABOUT UNCERTAINTY FOR INCLUSION
IN RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT TRAINING
Uncertainty is a central feature of risk assessment and
risk management.  Therefore, it is important for designers
of risk assessment and risk management training materials to
include coverage of uncertainty and reasonable assurance.
All the ideas presented here are applicable to any risk
assessment and risk management training materials.  This
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section proposes a very general process for incorporating
coverage of uncertainty and reasonable assurance into
existing risk assessment and risk management training
programs.  Chapter 4 presents a fully developed case study
that incorporates many of these principles.
The first step is to assess the information on
uncertainty and reasonable assurance already present in a
training program.  Following is a partial list of questions
training designers might want to ask about what information
is present:
o How is risk defined?
o How are uncertainties treated?
o Are the components of uncertainty separated?
o Are the causes of uncertainty discussed?
o   Are ways for dealing with uncertainties
discussed?
o   Are ways for thinking about making decisions
under uncertainty discussed?
For the EPA Workshop, risk assessment and risk management
are well-defined, but risk is not defined at all.
Uncertainties are virtually ignored (and thus components of
uncertainty are not separated).  The causes of uncertainty,
ways for dealing with uncertainty, and ways for thinking
about making decisions under uncertainty are not discussed.
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Once the designers have a clear idea of the level of
coverage already present in a program, they will need to
think about how to add additional coverage.  They might want
to consider these five goals:
o Ease of understanding,
o Clarity of terms,
o Ease of demonstration,
o Completeness of conception, and
o Rigor of thought.
Ease of understanding, clarity, and ease of
demonstration all have to do with how information is
presented.  They are important because many participants may
be hesitant about tackling uncertainty.  Therefore, it is
crucial that the presentation be as clear and easy to
understand as possible.  Before the presentation can be
clear, however, the designer must have a complete conception
of the problem of uncertainty.  This is not to say that the
presentation need include all of that conception, but rather
that the presenters must have that conception if they are to
be clear and consistent in what they do present.
Completeness of conception as presented and rigor of
thought should be tailored to fit the goals of the
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particular training materials.  In the Workshops discussed
here, the goal was a general understanding of risk
assessment and risk management.  Such a goal is best served
by a presentation that is not too rigorous, one that gives
participants a vocabulary and framework for thinking about
uncertainty without distracting them into unfruitful
discussions of statistical procedures and mathematics.  This
is probably true in general of most of EPA's risk training
materials; all of the ones reviewed in Crook (1988) had
similar goals.  A rigorous treatment of uncertainty analysis
and statistical methods for dealing with some uncertainties
would be far beyond the scope of any Workshop; even if they
were not, such topics would not be beneficial until the
student has grasped the more conceptual tools discussed
here.
In the next chapter, a case study is presented that
illustrates the concepts developed in this chapter.
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TABLE 3-1
EPA CARCINOGEN CLASSIFICATIONS
A   Human Carcinogen
B   Probable Human Carcinogen
Bl - Limited human data, sufficient animal data
B2 - Sufficient animal data
C   Possible Human Carcinogen - limited animal data
D   Not Classified - inadequate or no data
E   No Evidence for Carcinogenicity in Humans - data in
animals indicates the chemical is not carcinogenic
Source: ODW Workshops (EPA, 1988)
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FIGURE 3-1
SAMPLE PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION AND
CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY FUNCTION
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CHAPTER 4
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CASE STUDY FOR
INCLUDING IDEAS ABOUT UNCERTAINTY IN ODW WORKSHOPS
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCORPORATING GENERAL CONCEPTS
The Workshop as a whole should include a discussion or
presentation on why uncertainty is not merely important to
risk assessment and risk management, but central to them.
The concept of reasonable assurance, developed earlier,
should also be introduced.  This material is critical in
motivating the participant to make the effort to face the
problems resulting from uncertainty.  Without this
motivation, all that follows on uncertainty in the workshop
will be wasted.
The section on risk assessment needs a more explicit
discussion of the reasons for uncertainty.  At a minimum,
the presentation should cover ignorance and variability.
Conceptual/perceptual reasons for uncertainty would also be
useful.  The level of coverage on these ideas need only be a
brief description of what is meant by each cause, some
examples of types of uncertainties that spring from each of
the causes, and how these are related to confidence.
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The risk assessment section also needs a discussion of
ways the regulator might think about or describe
uncertainty.  This should not be a rigorous, statistical
presentation on uncertainty analysis, but rather a
discussion of basic ideas of probability and an explanation
of probability density function and cumulative probability
function graphs.   The participants in the case study groups
reviewed earlier had a lot of trouble deciding how they
should express the uncertainty in the problem; they badly
needed a vocabulary (including some graphical devices) for
talking about uncertainty.
Finally, the risk assessment section would benefit from
a discussion of the idea of sufficient evidence for
justifying decisions to act, discussed earlier.  This is a
very powerful way of thinking about making decisions under
uncertainty.  The coordinators need to raise questions such
as "how much certainty is necessary to take different kinds
of action?" and "does the evidence justify action X?"  There
are no easy answers to these questions, nor should the
Workshop attempt to provide answers.  But the Workshop must
raise these questions so that they may be discussed.  The
participants in the case study groups struggled with how to
incorporate the uncertainty in the evidence into the
decision making process; the concept of sufficient evidence
50
would provide them with a framework for articulating this
difficulty.
In risk assessment, the concern with uncertainty is
focused on how to express it; in risk management, the
concern should be on how to make decisions under
uncertainty.  Dealing with uncertainty is central to risk
management, but it was almost entirely missing from the
Workshop presentation.
The section on risk management needs a presentation of
reasonable assurance.  The concept of reasonable assurance
should be the foundation of any regulatory decision making
process involving risk and uncertainty.  Participants should
be introduced to the idea of reasonable assurance and
encouraged to work from that base.  The presentation should
include an analysis of why best estimates and conservatism
do not satisfy the requirements of reasonable assurance, as
discussed earlier.  Participants should be encouraged to use
the idea of reasonable assurance in the risk management case
study.
The section on risk management also needs a basic
discussion of the ideas of decision theory.  The
presentation need not be highly theoretical or in-depth;
instead, the goal is to give participants a structure for
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thinking about the implications of uncertainty in the
decision making process.  They need to be made aware that
trade-offs must be made and how uncertainty might affect
those trade-offs.  Participants in the risk management case
study groups had no feeling for the importance of
uncertainty to the decision making process.  They ignored
all kinds of uncertainty built into the problem in their
rush for the most conservative decision.  It is not
surprising that the participants behaved this way; by
ignoring uncertainty, the presentations did nothing to
validate the idea that uncertainty was worth considering.
More important, it caused participants to resolve
uncertainty through implicit, rather than explicit, means.
Finally, the discussion of sufficient evidence
recommended for the risk assessment section is equally
applicable here.  The risk management section might include
another discussion of that subject as it applies to risk
management.
CASE STUDY:  RADON IN DRINKING WATER
Introduction
To illustrate the ideas about uncertainty and
reasonable assurance presented in this report, this section
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provides a worked example using the risks from radon in
drinking water.  The example is designed so that it could be
used directly by EPA in a training program with little
alteration.
Reasonable has been defined previously as "the giving
of reasons."  Using that definition, reasonable assurance
was defined as the giving of reasons that provide some
confidence that predictions about risk are correct.  For
EPA, prediction from a scientific model is what provides
confidence (Crawford-Brown and Cothern, 1987; Crawford-Brown
and Pearce, 1989).  Therefore, to achieve reasonable
assurance, EPA's regulations must be based on predictions of
risk from scientific models.  Risk has been defined as the
probability of an outcome for an individual (e.g., health
effects).  This case study uses scientific models to predict
the health effects from radon in drinking water and the
uncertainty about those effects.  (The effect considered is
lifetime incidence of cancer mortality.)
Sources of Uncertainty
The EPA has proposed a standard for radon in drinking
water of 300 pCi/1 (Crawford-Brown and Cothern, 1987).  The
standard-setting approach to regulating health hazards
raises two major questions or sources of uncertainty.
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First, will it be possible to attain the standard?  Second,
if the standard is attained, will it result in the desired
level of health effects?
How confident can EPA be that radon can be removed
from drinking water to a level of 300 pCi/1? There is solid
pragmatic evidence that radon can be removed to levels well
below 300 pCi/1.  Granular activated carbon (GAC) and
aeration have both been used reliably at full scale to
remove radon from drinking water with removal efficiencies
of 90 percent and greater  (Reid, et al., 1985).  Over 99
percent of the homes in the U.S. have radon levels of 1,000
pCi/1 or less (Crawford-Brown and Cothern, 1987); 90 percent
removal in those homes would result in levels at or below
100 pCi/1.  In light of such well-crafted pragmatic
evidence, there is virtually no uncertainty that a standard
of 300 pCi/1 can be achieved.  This case study will
therefore assume that the 300 pCi/1 standard is met or
exceeded in all homes.
How confident can EPA be that once the 300 pCi/1
standard is achieved, it will result in an acceptable level
of health effects?  The main health effect of concern with
radon is lung cancer.  There is crafting in the predictions
of lung cancer risk at high doses of radon, such as are
experienced by uranium miners (Crawford-Brown and Cothern,
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1987).  The evidence of this crafting is the ability of the
dose-response equations to fit the data with a large value
of r2 (the correlation coefficient, or measure of the degree
of empirical support for the dose-response equation).  This
does not, however, necessarily provide confidence at low
levels.  The bulk of the uncertainty associated with
predicting health effects from exposure to radon in drinking
water arises from questions about the reliability of
predictions of lung cancer cases at low doses.  This case
study will use a scientific model to predict the health
effects of radon in drinking water and to analyze the
uncertainty about that prediction.
Risk Model
Individuals may be exposed to radon from drinking water
by two pathways: inhalation of radon volatilized to air and
ingestion of contaminated water.  The EPA standard for radon
in drinking water is based only on the air pathway, for
which an uncertainty analysis has been done (Crawford-Brown
and Cothern, 1987).  EPA concluded that the water pathway
was not significant, but this decision was not based on a
scientific model and therefore does not satisfy EPA's
requirements for reasonable confidence (Cothern, pers.
comm.).  It has since been estimated that the risks
associated with the water pathway are roughly comparable
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with those of the air pathway, but no uncertainty analysis
has been done for the water pathway (Crawford-Brown, 1989).
Because the 300 pCi/1 standard is based only on air
exposures, this case study will focus on that pathway.
The risk from radon in drinking water by way of the air
pathway can be predicted as the product of several
parameters.^  To express the uncertainty associated with the
resulting estimates, it is necessary to make two
assumptions.
First, each parameter is assumed to be log-normally
distributed.  The literature suggests that many parameters
relevant to environmental risk assessment are log-normally
distributed (Crawford-Brown and Cothern, 1987).  The log-
normal assumption also results in an uncertainty analysis
that is relatively straightforward, both conceptually and
computationally.  An important property of a log-normal
distribution is that 68 percent of the values fall within
one geometric standard deviation (GSD) of the median (or
50th percentile).  The GSD is applied by multiplying or
dividing the median; thus the range of "within one GSD" is
from the median divided by the GSD to the median times the
GSD.  This is conceptually easy to understand, since
The risk model and all median and geometric
standard deviation (GSD) values used in this case
study are from Crawford-Brown and Cothern (1987).
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statements of confidence are formulated as "accurate to
within a factor of 2."  Using the median and the GSD of a
log-normal distribution, the 16th and 84th percentiles can
be calculated (16th = median/GSD, 84th = median*GSD).  With
those points and the median, a cumulative confidence curve
can easily be plotted on log-probability paper as a straight
line.
The second assumption is that confidence is a measure
of the subjective state of an individual (such as the
regulator).  The GSD for each parameter is a measure of the
uncertainty associated with it.  The GSDs used in this case
study reflect the expert judgement of Crawford-Brown and
Cothern (1987).  For each parameter, the paper provides two
GSDs:  one that reflects uncertainty about the average value
of the parameter and one that reflects the variability of
the parameter.  The first expresses the uncertainty of
predicting an average value for the U.S. population, while
the second expresses the uncertainty about predicting a
value for a particular individual or home.
Calculating Risk
The unit individual risk (or probability of contracting
lung cancer) per pCi/1 of radon in drinking water by the air
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pathway is estimated by the following model:
UIR = Ca/Cw * F * CFl * CF2 * T * RF (Eqn. 4-1)
where:
UIR =  unit individual risk in probability/person/pCi/1.
Ca/Cw =  transfer factor from water to air in pCi/1 air per
pCi/1 water.
F =  equilibrium factor (unitless).
CFl =  conversion factor, 1 WL/100 pCi/1 air (WL = Working
Level, a measure of radioactive activity).
CF2 =  Conversion factor from years to working months (170
hours), adjusted for unattached fraction and lung
model, in WM/year.
T =  length of exposure in years.
RF =  risk factor, adjusted for latency period, in
probability/person/WLM (WLM = Working Level Month,
a measure of radiation dose).
Table 4-1 shows the median, uncertainty GSD, and variability
GSD for each of these parameters.  Some parameters have more
than one GSD, because the uncertainty about them stems from
more than one separable source.  Each parameter and the
sources of its uncertainty are discussed briefly in the
following paragraphs.
The transfer factor from water to air, Ca/Cw, depends
on a variety of factors such as dwelling ventilation rate,
building size, water use, and water temperature (Crawford-
Brown and Cothern, 19 87).  Crawford-Brown and Cothern
suggest a median value of IxlO"'*; thus, for each pCi/1 in
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water, there will be  1x10"'* pCi/1 in air.  The range of
values in the literature for Ca/Cw suggest that this
parameter is accurate only to a factor of 2 to 3.
Therefore, Crawford-Brown and Cothern estimate the
uncertainty GSD to be 2.  Because ventilation rates,
building size, water use, and water temperature vary among
homes, the GSD is greater when variability is included.
Crawford-Brown and Cothern set the variability GSD at 4.
The concentration of radon in air is not directly of
concern in predicting health effects.  Rather, the
concentration of radon progeny (the radioactive decay
products of radon) is what is of concern.  The equilibrium
factor, F, is used to predict the equilibrium concentration
of radon progeny in air based on the radon concentration.
It is a fraction of the radon concentration and so must fall
between 0 and 1.  The equilibrium factor depends on
ventilation rate, building volume, and aerosol
characteristics.  As shown in Table 4-1, Crawford-Brown and
Cothern suggest a median value of 0.5, with an uncertainty
GSD of 1.2 and a variability GSD of 1.4.  The variability
GSD is slightly higher, due to variability in building
characteristics.
The conversion factor, CFl, from pCi/1 to WL is equal
to 0.01 by definition and is neither uncertain nor variable.
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The second conversion factor, CF2, from years to working (or
occupational) months encompasses uncertainty from two
sources and is adjusted for a third.  One occupational month
is 170 hours, so there are 51.5 occupational months in a
year.  However, Crawford-Brown and Cothern adjust this to 18
to account for the fact that people spend only a fraction of
their time at home.  This conversion factor includes
uncertainty from two sources: unattached fraction and
breathing rate.  The unattached fraction is a measure of the
fraction of radon progeny not attached to particles.  Radon
progeny deposit differently in the lung when they are
attached to particles than when they are not.  Crawford-
Brown and Cothern estimate the uncertainty GSD from
unattached fraction to be 1.2 and the variability GSD to be
1.4.  The typical individual has a lower breathing rate than
a uranium miners (on whom most of the data on effective dose
are based).  The breathing rate affects a person's exposure
and therefore, the effective dose.  Crawford-Brown and
Cothern suggest an uncertainty GSD of 2 and a variability
GSD of 3 for breathing rate.  These values are summarized in
Table 4-1.
The length of exposure in years, T, is taken to be 70,
the average lifespan of a person in the U.S.  It is not
considered to be uncertain for the purposes of this case
study.
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The risk factor, RF, relates dose to risk, (meaning
probability in this context), of contracting cancer.  The
risk factor is based on data from uranium miners exposed to
high doses of radon.  It is adjusted for latency period, and
encompasses uncertainty from that adjustment as well as two
other distinct sources (available data and extrapolation to
low dose).  Crawford-Brown and Cothern find an median
unadjusted value of 1x10"^ per person/WLM/year.  (Note that
these are not the same units as the adjusted risk factor
used in the unit risk equation.)  Based on the range of
available data, Crawford-Brown and Cothern suggest an
uncertainty GSD of 2 for the unadjusted value.  Because it
is not known how risk factors vary among individuals, the
variability GSD is taken to be the same as the uncertainty
GSD as a lower bound.  The risk factor is also uncertainty
as a result of extrapolation from the high doses experienced
by uranium miners to the low dose experienced by a typical
individual.  Crawford-Brown and Cothern suggest an
uncertainty GSD of 3 and a variability GSD of 5 for the
extrapolation form high to low dose.  Finally, the risk
factor is adjusted to account for the absence of risk during
the latency period (the time between exposure and
manifestation of the effects).  Crawford-Brown and Cothern
give a median adjusted value of 3x10"'* per person/WLM.  Note
that this changes the risk factor from an annual risk factor
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to a lifetime risk factor.  The uncertainty GSD associated
with the latency adjustment is 2 and the variability GSD is
3.  These values are summarized in Table 4-1.
Using the median values in Table 4-1 and the unit risk
equation given at the beginning of this section, the median
value of unit individual risk is 1.9x10"^ per person/pCi/1.
The lifetime individual risk can then be calculated from
this equation:
LIR = UIR * Cw (Eqn. 4-2)
where:
LIR =  lifetime individual risk in probability/person.
UIR =  unit individual risk in probability/person/pCi/1.
Cw =  concentration of radon in drinking water in pCi/1.
Using this equation and a value of 300 pCi/1, the lifetime
individual risk is 5.7x10"^.
Calculating the Overall GSD
For a multiplicative function of log-normally
distributed parameters, the overall GSD can be calculated
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from the individual GSDs by the following equation:
N
GSD = exp [S ln2(GSDi)]l/2 (Eqn. 4-3)i=l
where:
GSD =  overall GSD
GSDj_ =   GSD of parameter i
The overall GSD is calculated separately for uncertainty and
variability.  Using this equation and the GSD values in
Table 4-1, the overall uncertainty GSD is 6 and the overall
variability GSD is 16. A GSD of 6 corresponds to a 95
percent confidence interval spanning 3 orders of magnitude
(the 95 percent confidence interval ranges from the median
divided by the GSD squared to the median times the GSD
squared).  A GSD of 16 corresponds to a 95 percent
confidence interval of 4 orders of magnitude.
Constructing a Cumulative Confidence Distribution
Crawford-Brown and Cothern calculated median risk and
the overall GSD as discussed above, but they did not develop
a cumulative confidence distribution (CCD) from that
information. With a cumulative confidence distribution, a
regulator can determine the confidence that the risk will be
less than or equal to some specific, acceptable risk level.
For the purposes of this case study, an acceptable risk is
10-"^ (EPA, 1986) .
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The cumulative confidence distribution is constructed
by plotting the median, 16th percentile (median/GSD), and
84th percentile (median * GSD) on log-probability paper.
The scale on the y-axis of log-probability paper is called a
probability scale, and is designed to allow the plotting of
a CCD as a straight line.
Figure 4-1 shows the CCDs for uncertainty and
variability.  The x-axis shows lifetime individual risk from
300 pCi/1 on a log scale.  The y-axis is cumulative
confidence.  Both CCDs have the same median, but the
variability CCD is less steep, indicating greater
uncertainty.  The cumulative confidence of an acceptable
risk of 10"^ as a national average (i.e., accounting only
for uncertainty) is 62 percent.  The cumulative confidence
of 10"'^ risk for any particular individual (i.e., accounting
for both uncertainty and variability) is only 58 percent.
The CCDs in Figure 4-1 are both based on the proposed
300 pCi/1 standard.  CCDs may also be plotted for different
possible standards to compare the confidence that an
acceptable risk will result from different alternative
standards.  Table 4-2 shows the median value of lifetime
individual risk for a range of radon concentrations (Cw)
from 100 to 800 pCi/1, calculated from Equation 4-2.  The
64
GSD is the same for all values of Cw, since all of the
uncertainty and variability are in the unit individual risk.
Figure 4-2 shows the CCDs based on uncertainty for the
different values of Cw.  The higher the standard, the less
confidence that a particular risk (here, lO"'^) will be
achieved.  Table 4-2 also shows the confidence associated
with a risk of  10"'* for each concentration.  As the
standard drops from 800 to 100 pCi/1, the confidence
increases from 41 percent to 83 percent.
Calculating Cost
Each different standard implies not only a different
level of confidence, as seen in Figure 4-2, but a different
cost.  Cost can be calculated as follows:
TAC = UAC * HSHLDS (Eqn. 4-4)
where:
TAC =  Total annual cost in $/year
UAC =  Unit annual cost in $/year/household
HSHLDS =  Number of households affected
The unit annual cost is a function of the method used to
remove radon (granulated activated carbon (GAC) or
aeration).  In this range of target concentrations, it is
not a function of the desired concentration.  Reid (1985,
citing Lowry, 1981) presents the capital and operating costs
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per household of removing radon by GAC and aeration.  Table
4-3 summarizes those costs.  Unit annual cost can be
calculated from these values by the following equation:
UAC = (CAP + 70 * OPER)/70 (Eqn. 4-5)
where:
CAP =  Capital cost in $
OPER =  Operating cost in $/year
70 =  Lifetime in years
Table 4-3 also presents the unit annual cost for each
option.  For GAC, the annual cost is $27/household; for
aeration, it is $73/household.
The number of households affected is a function of the
standard.  A household is affected if it has a radon
concentration above the standard. The lower the standard,
the greater the number of households affected, and
therefore, the greater the cost.  Crawford-Brown and Cothern
(1987) present graphically the cumulative incidence of
population for a range of radon concentrations.  These
represent the fraction of population with radon
concentrations at or above any particular concentration.
Table 4-4 presents the fraction of population exceeding each
of the concentrations in the 100 to 800 pCi/1 range.  Table
4-4 also shows the total population exceeding each
concentration, based on a total U.S. population of 250
million people.  The last column in Table 4-4 shows the
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number of households exceeding each concentration, assuming
an average of 3 people per household.  As the standard drops
from 800 to 100 pCi/1, the number of households affected
increases from 830,000 to 25,000,000.
Table 4-5 presents the total annual cost for each
possible standard for GAC and aeration.  The cumulative
confidence of achieving a risk of 10"'* is also reproduced
from Table 4-2.  Plotting these against each other produces
a cost versus confidence graph, shown in Figure 4-3, with
confidence on the x-axis and total annual cost on the y-
axis.  Using this graph, a regulator can easily compare the
costs of different levels of confidence.  The costs for both
treatments, but especially aeration, increase sharply after
about 60 percent confidence, with costs exceeding one
billion dollars for confidence over 70 percent for aeration.
The proposed 300 pCi/1 standard falls right at the 60
percent point, before costs begin to increase sharply.
Discussion
Reducing Uncertainty
The cumulative confidence of achieving 10"'* risk with a
standard of 300 pCi/1 is not very high, even considering
only uncertainty (and not variability).  EPA typically uses
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a confidence level of 95 percent, whereas the confidence for
300 pCi/1 is only 62 percent.  One way to increase
confidence is to lower the standard; however, as seen in
Figure 4-3, this may be quite expensive.  It is clearly not
feasible to reduce the standard to a point where 95 percent
confidence is achieved.
There is another way to increase confidence, and that
is by reducing uncertainty about the parameters in the risk
model.  Uncertainty can be reduced by two kinds of research,
depending on the nature of the parameter and the uncertainty
about it.  The first group of parameters requires more
knowledge or fundamental research to reduce uncertainty.
Such parameters include the lung deposition model, latency,
and high to low dose extrapolation.  The other group of
parameters requires more accurate measurements to decrease
uncertainty.  These parameters include the water to air
transfer factor, equilibrium factor, unattached fraction,
and lung deposition.
The CCD can be used to identify the relative
sensitivity of confidence to the uncertainty of each
parameter by eliminating the parameter's GSD from the
overall GSD and plotting a new CCD.  Table 4-6 shows the
uncertainty GSD of each parameter and the overall GSD if the
uncertainty from that parameter were eliminated.  The larger
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the parameter GSD, the greater the effect eliminating it has
on the overall GSD.  Figure 4-4 shows CCDs for 300 pCi/1
with a range of GSDs.  The GSD doesn't affect the median, so
the median is the same for each CCD.  Instead, the GSD
affects the slope of the CCD, with flatter curves providing
less confidence of a particular risk being achieved.
Table 4-7 shows the cumulative confidence of achieving
10-4 risk for each of the CCDs shown in Figure 4-4.  Even
with the overall GSD reduced to 2 (which would require the
elimination of uncertainty from extrapolation, with a GSD of
3, and any one of the parameters with a GSD of 2, such as
latency) the confidence of achieving 10"'* is only 80
percent.  The difficulty achieving high levels of confidence
stems from the closeness of the median risk (5.7x10"^) to
the acceptable risk (10"'*).  With a lower standard (and
hence lower median risk) the effects of reducing uncertainty
would be more striking.  An analysis like this could be
useful in targeting research where it has the most potential
to reduce uncertainty and increase confidence.
Targeting Susceptible Populations
One reason regulating radon in drinking water is so
costly is the large number of households with radon
concentrations over the standard.  An alternative approach
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would be to try to target particularly susceptible
households for radon removal.  Suppose the risk model
parameter median values are taken as given (i.e., no
uncertainty about the "average" value).  Some of the
parameters still exhibit considerable variability, so that
all homes with a radon concentration over 300 pCi/1 may
still result in a wide range of different risks.  What if
EPA could target houses with a tendency toward high water-
to-air transfer factors, equilibrium factors, or unattached
fractions?  Or identify individuals who deposit radon
preferentially in their lungs or have higher breathing
rates?  It is not feasible to identify the second set of
individual characteristics (breathing rate, etc.), and it
may not even be feasible to identify the first set of
household characteristics, but such an approach might be
feasible in other regulatory settings.  EPA might also
attempt to control building characteristics (such as
ventilation rates) that contribute to extreme parameter
values that increase risk above the median.
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TABLE 4-1
RISK MODEL PARAMETERS
ter Median Units
GSD
Parame Una. Var. Source
ca/cw Air/Water
Transfer
Factor
1x10--4 pCi/1 per
pCi/1
2 4
F Equilibrium
Factor
0.5 unitless 1.2 1.4
CFl Conversion
Factor 1
0.01 WL/pCi/1 — —
CF2 Conversion
Factor 2
18 WM/year 1.2
2
1.4
3
Unattached
Fraction
Lung Model
T Exposure
Duration
70 years — —
RF Risk
Factor
3x10"-4 1/WLM/
person
2
3
2
2
5
3
Available
Data
Extrapolation
Latency
Source:  Crawford-Brown and Cothern (1987)
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FIGURE 4-1
CUMULATIVE CONFIDENCE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR
UNCERTAINTY AND VARIABILITY
FOR Cw = 300 pCi/1
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TABLE 4-2
MEDIAN RISK AND CUMULATIVE CONFIDENCE OF lO"'* RISK
FOR Cw = 100 to 800 pCi/1
Median Lifetime Cumulative
Cw Individual Risk Confidence
(pci/1) (risk/person) (percent)
100 1.9x10-5 83
200 3.8x10-5 70
300 5.7x10-5 62
500 9.5x10-5 51
800 1.5x10-4 41
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FIGURE 4-2
CUMULATIVE CONFIDENCE DISTRIBUTIONS
FOR UNCERTAINTY ONLY
Cw = 100 to 800 pCi/1
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TABLE 4-3
CAPITAL AND OPERATING COST PER HOUSEHOLD
OF RADON REMOVAL
Treatment
Option
Capital
Cost
($/hshld)
Annual
Operating Cost
($/yr/hshld)___
Total
Annual Cost*
($/yr/hshld)
GAC
Aeration
500
900
20
60
27
73
Assumes lifespan of 70 years
Source:  Reid (1985) citing Lowry (1981)
TABLE 4-4
AFFECTED HOUSEHOLDS FOR
Cw = 100 to 800 pCi/1
75
Cw Population Exceeding CW
(fraction)______(millions)
Households
Exceeding Cw
(millions)
100
200
300
500
800
0.30
0.15
0.07
0.04
0.01
75
38
18
10
2.5
25
13
5.8
3.3
0.83
Source:  Crawford-Brown and Cothern (1987)
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TABLE 4-5
ANNUAL COST AND CUMULATIVE CONFIDENCE OF lO""^ RISK
FOR Cw = 100 to 800 pCi/1
Annual Cost Cumulative
Cw GAC Aeration Confidence
(pCi/1) (million $) (million $) (percent)
100 680 1,800 83
200 340 910 70
300 160 430 62
500 90 240 51
800 23 61 41
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FIGURE 4-3
ANNUAL COST VS. CUMULATIVE CONFIDENCE
OF 10"'^ RISK
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TABLE 4-6
EFFECT ON OVERALL GSD OF ELIMINATING
INDIVIDUAL UNCERTAINTY SOURCES
Parameter
Parameter
Source      Unc. GSD
Overall GSD
if omitted
Base Case (no parameter GSDs omitted) 6
Ca/Cw Air/Water
Transfer
Factor
2 5
F Equilibrium
Factor
1.2 6
CF2 Conversion
Factor 2
Unattached
Fraction
1.2 6
Lung Model 2 5
RF Risk
Factor
Available
Data
2 5
Extrapolation 3 4
Latency 2 5
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FIGURE 4-4
CUMULATIVE CONFIDENCE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR
A RANGE OF GSD VALUES
Cw = 300 pCi/1
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TABLE 4-7
CUMULATIVE CONFIDENCE OF lO"'^ RISK
FOR A RANGE OF GSD VALUES
Cw = 300 pCi/1
Cumulative
Confidence
GSD__________(percent)_________Source of Uncertainty Omitted*
16 58 None (from Variability)
6 62 None
Omit Equilibrium Factor
Omit Unattached Fraction (CF2)
5 64 Omit Lung Model (CF2)
Omit Air/Water Transfer
Omit Available Data (RF)
Omit Latency (RF)
4 66 Omit Extrapolation (RF)
3 69
2 80 Omit Extrapolation (RF) and
any source with GSD = 2
* From overall uncertainty GSD, except for GSD = 16, which
represents overall variability GSD.
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